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Abstract  
  
     Since 1976 a ”Green energy cluster” consisting of renewable energy technologies such as 
wind power, solar energy and biomass technologies, and energy conservation technologies has 
developed in Denmark. The export of these technologies has increased from 540 mill. ECU in 
1992 to around 5000 mill. ECU in 2002 and the employment have increased to around 25000 
persons. This sector consequently is one of the main reasons why the Denmark had a balance 
of payment surplus of 4800 mill. ECU in 2002 and a relatively low unemployment rate. 
But which were the main reasons behind this development of a “Green Energy Cluster”? This 
is the main question to be dealt with in this paper. 
The main agents were the grass root movements within renewable energy, the Parliament, the 
medium scale production companies and the energy companies. 
In general the energy companies regarded the new  “Green technologies” as competitors to 
their large power plants based upon coal and oil, and tried to slow down and/or hinder the 
“green innovation” process. The success was achieved by an active collaboration between 
some politicians recognising that an active energy policy was necessary and possible, private 
construction firms and an energy grass root movement. In this process a set of very concrete 
institutional reforms were established during the eighties and the nineties, furthering the 
“Green innovation “ development process.  
This paper deal with the innovative political process developing the institutional reforms as 
well as a description of a set of concrete institutional reforms furthering the innovative 
development. 
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1. The Danish example of  democracy and “Green innovation2”  
The goal of Danish Energy Planning include a 20% reduction of greenhouse gas emissions 
between 1988 and 2005 and 50% before 2030. Technical scenario analyses have shown that 
achieving this goal requires the introduction of massive energy conservation measures, 
renewable energy technologies and combined heat and power systems (CHP systems). This 
again has as its consequence, that the necessary techniques do not “fit” into the organisational 
structures of today’s energy system, with its links to the fossil fuel organisations and 
techniques, and its sectored divisions of heat, power and transport organisation.  
Therefore it is not surprising; that the new techniques within combined heat and power 
(CHP) and renewable energy did not develop within the existing fossil fuel based energy 
organisations. On the contrary these techniques wind turbines and decentralised CHP plants 
were introduced and implemented by grassroots organisations and local heat companies, 
despite strong resistance from the established energy companies. The process was that 
grassroots movements and local small heat co-operatives were arguing in the media and 
“lobbying” for the establishment of new reforms at the central level to support these new 
techniques.  Subsequently Parliament let itself be inspired and made new laws, which 
supported the introduction of the new techniques. After the introduction of these new 
reforms, the local heat and wind turbine co-operatives would then implement the technique. 
The process can be named a “bottom up-top down-bottom action” process, which has nothing 
to do with a rigid central planning procedure, but is more of a procedure, by means of which 
the grassroots organisations, the general public and local heat companies by Parliamentary 
intervention are given the opportunity to introduce and implement innovations in the energy 
scene. We call this process a process of innovative democracy, and it is developed by 
introducing a set of measures, which we here will define as political liberalisation.  
The above-described innovative democracy has brought some remarkable developments 
within wind power and CHP in Denmark. In 2001 wind power supplying 15% of total 
electricity consumption and more than 40% electricity was supplied from wind power and 
combined heat and power plants (CHP). At the same time the power efficiency of the power 
plants has been increasing constantly.  
All together the total production by Danish Wind Turbine manufacturers rose from around 
200 MW/year in 1991 to around 2000 MW/year in 2001, and the Danish export of wind 
turbines amounted to about 2700 million ECU in 2001. The export of the “Green cluster “ of 
energy technologies linked to the Danish energy policy (including wind turbines) increased 
from 530 mill. ECU in 1992 to 4700 ECU in 2001. Amongst others linked to this 
development Denmark went from a deficit on the balance of payment in the eighties to a 
surplus of almost 5000 mill.  ECU in 2001. At the same time unemployment rates went down 
from around 9% in 1992 to around 5% in 2001. 
So the Danish energy policy was one of the most important causes behind the relative success 
of the Danish economy in the nineties. In the following we will take a closer look upon this 
development. 
 
                                                          
2 The concept “Green innovation” is used for a process, where a systematic transformation, from fossil 
fuel technologies to energy conservation and renewable energy technologies, is taking place. 
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2. The wind power development 
According to the ministerial plan wind power should cover around 20% of the electricity 
production in 2005, and 50% around 2030.  
 
The wind power production cost at a good coastal site has developed from around 14 EUR/C 
per kWh in 1984 to 8 EUR/C per kWh in 1991 and around 5 EUR/C per kWh in 2001.  
The wind power regulation regime has been of the type where buyers of windmills receive a 
fixed price from the electricity companies and a fixed public service payment for CO2-free 
electricity production from the Government. This is here termed a “Political price-/amount 
market" [1] system. This system motivated the producers to lower their production prices, as 
they were in a situation where more windmills could be sold if the prices of wind turbines 
decreased.  
 
The wind turbine industry did not develop out of a situation that allowed the existing 
monopoly market to act on its own. If anything, there was a systematic public interference in 
this monopoly market, breaking its “barrier to entry” institutions and opening the door for the 
wind power technology. By means of an array of institutional reforms, an increased freedom 
to enter the market was established. Examples of such reforms include the following: 
 
The reforms back in the eighties, and their political background can be shortly described 
within the wind power field. Initially there was:  
 
- A 30% investment subsidy 
- Utility obligation to buy wind power at a price equal to 85% of the price paid by 
consumer using a 20,000 kWh/year 
- A right to produce up to 7000 kWh wind power without income tax payment 
- The establishment of a public wind power test station at Risø Research Centre 
- Spare capacity in the machine industry 
- A motivated population 
 
In this phase, lasting until around 1992, more than 3000 co-operative wind turbines were 
installed. Typically, a co-operative wind turbine has between 20 and 40 owners. This means 
that around 1990, there were between 100,000 and 150,000 owners of wind turbines in 
Denmark. Among other elements in the process, this was the result of a discussion in the 
organisation for renewable energy (OVE), a green grassroots organisation (NGO), which 
fought for this co-operative model. This model managed to secure very stable public support 
for wind power and it made this very vulnerable industry survive during the lean years, with 
very low export between 1987 and 1991. 
Since 1992, the development has been supported by a steady increase in the export markets, 
combined with the development of larger wind turbines (600-2000 kW) and a 30-40% 
decrease in kWh prices. 
The preconditions for the above development were: 
 
At the political level, 
- Efficient grassroots movements: especially the Organisation for Renewable Energy 
(OVE), and the anti nuclear movement (OOA). 
- A rather open and active public debate. 
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- A specific balance in the Parliament, with small non-corporate parties having some 
power. 
- A situation where the energy companies systematically worked against innovative 
renewable energy technologies. 
 
At the cultural level, 
- A tradition for wind power. The “modern” 200 kW Gedser Wind Turbine was closed 
down in the late 1960’s, so the technology was still “recent”. Prior to this, Poul La Cour 
had established 2-6 kW direct current electricity generating wind turbines around 1900. 
By 1916, there were 1300 of these turbines in Denmark [2].  A successful tradition for 
consumer co-operatives followed within many sectors. 
 
At the industrial basis level 
- An industrial structure, with many small (agricultural) machine factories. 
- Collaboration between the State financed Risø Test Centre and private industries. 
 
3. The development of decentralised CHP in Denmark 
By around 1988, all cities in Denmark with a population above 60,000 inhabitants had 
combined production of electricity and heat (“combined heat and power” (CHP)). These CHP 
systems are largely coal based. Back in 1975, there had been a discussion of establishing 
CHP units in the smaller cities. But the utilities, in agreement with the Ministry of Trade, 
which at that time was in charge of the energy area and opted for nuclear power, did not want 
to take this possibility into consideration.  
 
The grassroots organisations, OVE and OOA, argued for decentralised CHP, as it was an 
alternative to nuclear power. The Utilities, the Ministry of Trade, and later, the Ministry of 
Energy argued that CHP in small cities was not technically possible, and if at all possible, it 
would be too expensive. Furthermore, even if it was technically possible and economically 
feasible, the potential was so small that it would be a waste of time to discuss it. 
 
As late as 1988, the potential for decentralised CHP in Denmark was considered by the 
authorities and the Utilities to be, at most, 450 MW. In 1989, a new Minister of Energy came 
into office, and “suddenly” the next energy plan, “Energy 2000” [3], showed a potential of 
between 1400 and 2000 MW with regard to decentralised CHP, including industrial CHP. 
 
Different institutional preconditions were established, including the utility obligation to buy 
electricity from CHP plants according to “avoided cost” pricing for electricity sold to the grid 
based upon the principle of long-run marginal costs (LRMC). Furthermore, a public CO2 
subsidy of 1.3 EUR/Cent/kWh sold electricity from CHP plants based on natural gas and a 
municipal warranty linked to financing the plants was introduced. 
 
These institutional reforms had an enormous effect. From 1990 to 2001, the power 
productions from decentralised CHP units increased from 1% of total electricity consumption 
to more than 30%. Of these decentralised CHP units, 60% are organised, as co-operatives 
owned by the residents in a small town or village. The units have between 0.5 and 5 MW 
electrical capacity and are mostly fuelled by natural gas.  
 
 5
Strong resistance from the utilities - and, for many years, also from the central administration 
- has characterised the political process behind the introduction of the necessary institutional 
reforms. The policy has been a “bottom-up” generated policy established through 
considerable public pressure from grassroots movements, local heat co-operatives and some 
members of Parliament. 
 
 
But what are the causes behind the resistance to change within the existing uranium and fossil 
fuel based power companies? That’s the question in the next section. 
 
4. The character of the technological change from fossil fuel based- to “green energy” 
technologies- a case of path dependency 
The alternatives to uranium-, large coal-, oil-, and gas-fired power plants are electricity 
conservation, renewable energy and cogeneration technologies. Some of the differences 
between these new “sunrise” technologies, and the old “sunset” technologies are described in 
Table 1 below. 
 
Old techniques “Sunset 
technologies” 
New techniques “Sunrise technologies” 
1) Based upon a high level of 
fossil fuel and uranium 
consumption. 
(1) Based upon energy conservation, 
renewable energy and integrated 
efficient energy supply systems.  
2) Technical solutions are not 
contextually adaptable. 
(2) Technical solutions differ from place 
to place. 
3) Implementation in single 
purpose organisations. 
(3) Implementation in multipurpose 
organisations. 
(4) Sectored energy systems. (4) Integrated energy systems. 
(5) High degree of asset 
specificity; long technical 
lifetime, high capital costs and 
large strong organisations.  
(5) High asset specificity, medium long 
technical lifetime, moderately strong 
organisations. 
(6) Historically strong from a 
political point of view. 
(6) Historically weak from a political 
point of view. 
(7) Mostly using known 
techniques. 
(7) Often demand new techniques. 
(8) Often linked to existing 
knowledge. 
(8) Often require new knowledge. 
(9) Often based upon existing 
organisations. 
(9) Often require new organisations. 
 
Table 1. Institutional characteristics of the “Sunset” and “Sunrise” technologies.[4] 
 
The different characteristics at many levels of “sunrise” and “sunset “ technologies 
alternatives indicate that the new technologies do not fit well in the organisation of the old 
fossil fuel and uranium technologies. This means that the organisations linked to these old 
technologies will be ill equipped to compete in the arena of the new technologies. 
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Consequently, one might expect heavy organisational resistance from the old technologies 
against the new technologies. This assumption has been confirmed in the Danish case over 
the last 25 years. This conclusion will be enforced, when discussing the value -added changes 
for old and new organisations, when participating in this radical technological change. 
 
The value-added chain and the change from “sunset” to “sunrise” technologies 
A main theoretical cognition here is that the motivation for innovation varies from firm to 
firm, and that this variation amongst others is a function of cost- and value-added structure. 
 
The value-added chain of uranium/ fossil fuel based systems 
The question is what are the general characteristics of the present fossil fuel and uranium 
based electricity supply systems, which at present, controls between 80% and 90% of the 
world’s electricity market. This is a crucial investigation, as we are dealing with a system 
which, to a very large extent, has to be replaced with energy conservation and renewable 
energy systems within the next 20-40 years. Figure 2 illustrates the value-added flow in these 
systems; here they are represented by the Danish system based upon large coal-fired power 
plants. 
 
 
Figure 2. Value added distribution in a coal-fired electricity system3, 4 [4] 
 
Figure explanation: We have an electricity supply system delivering electricity at the 
consumer level for 100 value units, for instance, 100 DKK. Looking at I, the Direct 
Electricity Supply System, it can be seen that out of these 100 DKK, 53.3 DKK is paid to the 
direct electricity supply system as a whole, with 26 DKK paid for coal, 9.3 DKK paid to the 
employees the power production stations, 3.4 paid to the employees at the transmission 
system, and 14.6 paid to the employees of the distributions system. 
                                                          
3  Source Calculated on the basis of SØ89-112, 10 April 1989 ELSAM, Statistic 1991, DEF, and 
Statistisk tiårsoversigter 1980-1989. The cost distribution between production and transmission is 
calculated on the basis of SØ89-112, ELSAM. In this calculation an interest rate of 1% is used, which 
was the inherent interest rate in the cost structure at that time. With a higher interest rate, the indirect 
electricity supply system would have a higher proportion of the 100 value added units. 
4 It is worthwhile to remark that future electricity systems with no fuel use will ceteris paribus have a 
higher proportion of the value added chain within direct and indirect power production, transmission 
and distribution. Furthermore, it is probable that a higher proportion will be in the indirect electricity 
system. 
I. Direct Electricity Supply System
1. Fuel
26
2. Power
production
9.3
3. Transmission
3.4
4. Distribution
14.6
8. Sale
100
II. Indirect Electricity Supply System
5. Power plant
equipment
27.6
6. Transmission
equipment
8.6
7. Distribution
equipment
10.5
Kommentar [PCRUM1]:  
 
[JF] The amount of 53.3 should 
also be included in Figure 8, 
somewhere, perhaps showing 
clearly that 1. Fuel, 2. Power 
Production, 3. Transmission, and 
4. Distribution all add up to be 
53.3 in IV. Direct electricity 
supply system. All numbers listed 
in the text (sums of equipment 
producers and sums of employees 
of the distribution system, and 
even sums of what is paid to the 
power plant producers, etc.) should 
be shown in the figure, as well. 
More suggestions come later in 
this text. 
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So out of 100 DKK, 27.3 DKK is paid to the employees in the direct electricity system. 
 
Looking at II, the Indirect Electricity Supply System, 46.7 DKK total is paid to the indirect 
electricity supply system. Out of these, 27.6 is paid to power plant equipment producers, 8.6 
DKK to producers of transmission equipment and 10.5 DKK to producers of distribution 
network systems.  
 
The value-added chain of energy conservation- renewable energy systems 
The present electricity system in Denmark includes wind power production amounting to 
15% of the total Danish electricity consumption as well as some development of biomass-
based electricity production. Upcoming developments will probably also include the 
extensive use of photovoltaic and wave energy-based electricity production. Further use of 
wind-power will require the introduction of regulation facilities synchronising the wind 
power production with the consumers consumption needs. But what are the typical features 
of these “new” non-fossil fuel and non-uranium technologies, when described with the same 
“value-added chain” methodology, as we have used above? Figure 2 deals with this question. 
                                     
 
 
                                                               
Figure 2. The value-added chain of upcoming renewable energy and conservation 
systems [4] 
 
Figure explanation: The assumption is that the renewable energy system can produce energy 
at the same price and with the same transmission and distribution grid as the current network 
system. A further assumption in this example is that the renewable energy technologies are 
distributed in such a way that one-third of the indirect electricity supply system will be linked 
to the central transmission level, one-third to the decentralised distribution level, and one-
third to the household level. With these assumptions, the value-added distribution will be as 
shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 1 shows the value-added chain in a typical "sunset" coal/uranium based electricity 
production system. Figure 2 illustrates a typical "sunrise" renewable energy conservation 
value-added chain at the energy scene. In the following we will shortly analyse the 
consequences of establishing a transition between the "sunset" technology value-added chain 
in Figure 1 and the "sunrise" technology value-added chain in Figure 2. 
 
I. The  Direct Electricity Supply System
II. The Indirect Electricity Supply System
( 6 )  Sale
100
III. Consumer level
(1 ) Transmission
3.4
(2 ) Distribution
14.6
(3 ) Centralised
renewable energy
equipment 27.3
(4 ) Decentralised
renewable energy
   equipment    27.3
( 5 )  Consumer
organised
conservation and
renewable energy
 equipment 27.3
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Technological change and the value-added loss of fossil fuel and uranium based companies 
The characteristics of the value-added change from fossil fuel and uranium based to 
renewable energy systems can be described by combining Figure 1 with Figure 2, as it is 
done in Figure 3 below. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The change in value-added profile connected to the change from uranium and 
fossil fuel -, to renewable energy and energy conservation systems. [4] 
 
Figure explanation: In the old fossil fuel based system a 100 Dkk sale at consumer level will 
have the value added divided between the different levels of vertical integration as shown in 
the upper figure.  
 
The figure at the bottom shows the value-added distribution in an energy conservation and 
renewable energy system. 
 
From Figure 3 we can observe that the value-added chain of renewable energy and 
conservation (REC) technologies differs clearly seen in relation to the value-added chain in a 
fossil fuel based system within two areas: 
 
a. In the REC value-added chain, the fossil fuel value-added part has disappeared, and is 
replaced by investment in renewable energy capital equipment. 
b. In the REC value-added chain, the power production value-added in a specific direct 
electricity supply system organisation has been replaced by “renewable energy system 
automation”, where it is probable that the maintenance, at least at the decentralised and 
consumer level, will be performed by the suppliers of the windmills, the photovoltaic 
cells, the hydrogen production system, the electricity battery charging system, etc. The 
From  fossil to renewable energy
IV. Direct Electricity Supply System
1. Fuel
 26
2. Power production
 9.3
3. Transmission
 3.4
4. Distribution
 14.6
8. Sale
100
V. Indirect Electricity Supply System
IV. Direct Electricity Supply System
3.
Centralised
renewable
energyV. Indirect Electricity Supply System
1. Transmission
 3.4
2. Distribution
 14.6
3. Centralised
renewable energy
equipment
27,3
4. Decentralised
renewable energy
equipment
 27,3
 6. Sale
100
III. Consumer  level
5. Consumer
conservation and
renewable energy
 equipment     27,3
5. Power plant
 equipment
 27.6
 6. Transmission
 equipment
 8.6
 7. Distribution
 equipment
10.5
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need for a specific power production organisation might decrease or disappear, as the day 
to day work on a power plant has been replaced by automatons requiring maintenance 
from, for instance, the windmill factory. 
 
It is naturally possible that the existing power company organisations will take over the 
maintenance of the renewable energy automatons, especially those connected with the 
large renewable energy plants at sea. But even in this case, the added value directly 
linked to the power sector will only be halved compared to the present day. 
 
As a consequence of (a) and (b), the direct electricity supply system organisation might 
therefore decrease its size until it only consists of the transmission organisation and the 
distribution network organisation. 
 
Consequently, a main characteristic of technological change, as illustrated in Figure 3, can be 
that the part of the indirect electricity supply system which directly relates to equipment for 
power production. Transmission and distribution might increase from today’s 46.7% of the 
total value added in the fossil fuel system to, in this Figure 3 case, 81 % of the added value in 
a renewable energy system. This is mainly due to the fact that fuel import is replaced by 
renewable energy equipment/capital. 
 
An electricity system, like the German one, with its ownership integration of fuel extraction, 
power production, transmission and distribution would decrease in value-added share from 
50-60% of the electricity price to around 20%, if successfully introducing REC energy 
automatons. This might heavily reduce the profit base of these companies, and reduce the 
share value considerably. 
 
In an electricity system like the Danish, the value-added decrease would be considerably 
lower, from around 27% to around 18% of the electricity price. 
 
From the above discussion we can conclude: 
a) That due to the different institutional characteristics of at the one hand the uranium and 
fossil fuel “sunset” technologies, and at the other hand the energy conservation and 
renewable energy “sunrise” technologies, there is an organisational resistance against 
“Green innovation” build into the old uranium and fossil fuel companies. 
b) That people and organisations linked to the old system are simultaneously losing value-
added, since their organisations have no comparative advantage, when dealing with the 
new technologies, and therefore cannot expect to achieve 100% of the market for energy 
conservation and renewable energy. 
c) That even if we assumed that the old uranium and fossil fuel companies would achieve a 
100% market share of the energy conservation and renewable energy technologies, they 
would lose value-added, as the value-added share in the direct electricity system 
decreases in the “Green innovation” transformation process. 
Large parts of the jobs and profit thus will go to new technological systems with very 
different value-added profiles and organisational “needs”. Consequently the political system 
should be aware, that a “green innovation” policy would meet systematic resistance from the 
old uranium and fossil fuel companies.  
But how should the political process be designed in order to cope with this resistance. This 
question is in focus in the next section. 
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5. Conclusion: Political liberalization and the levels of political and institutional 
change 
In figure 4, the different “battlefields” of technological transformation are illustrated. 
 
Figure 4. “Green innovation” and political liberalisation 
 
In box (1), goals the discourse regarding the goals and norms is performed. 
In box (2), the discourse regarding the realistic technical scenarios is carried through. 
In box (3), the discussion regarding concrete institutional reforms is taken. 
In box (4), the discussion with regard to design of political institutions is of importance. 
In box (4a and 4b) the design of the information and resource balance between lobbyists 
linked to the old uranium and fossil fuel interests (4a), and the lobbyists which are economic 
independent from the interests of the uranium and fossil fuel companies. 
 
The concrete Danish development from 1975-2001 has been influenced at each of these 
levels.  Here we will mainly conclude with regard to level 4, the political processes and level 
4a and 4b, the information and resource balance between economic dependent and economic 
independent lobbyists. 
From the Danish experience we can conclude, that if the parliamentarians want to have 
different political scenarios to chose between, they must establish a resource and 
information balance between the economic dependent and the economic independent 
lobbyists. The establishment of this balance is essential, if a successful transformation from 
uranium and fossil fuel technologies to energy conservation and renewable energy 
technologies should be fulfilled. The institutions constituting this balance can be called the 
institutions of political liberalisation. 
 
They are for instance: 
 
(2) Alternative technical scenarios
-Energy conservation ,renewable
energy,cogeneration
(3) Alternative Institutional
Scenarios:
-Financing conditions ,tarriffs,
research policy,educations
policy, etc.
-
(4) Political process
-      Openness in the public
administration
- Active and well informed
population, etc.
(4b) Economically independent
grassroots lobbyists, the general
public, etc.
(4a) Economically dependent
lobbyists.  Fossil fuel companies,
parts of the trade unions, assoc.of
Danish industry,etc.
(1) Goals
Efficiency with regard
to:
a.  Supply security
b.  Cost and Price
c   Environment
d.  Innovation
e.  System
     development
f.   Democracy
g.  Competitiveness
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-  The presence or establishment of independent research units, for instance independent 
Universities, which have the freedom and the resources necessary to be able to design 
technical scenarios, which are independent of the present central administration and the 
large energy companies. Such independent universities were present in the Danish 
development, and made alternative energy scenarios in 1976[5], 1983[6], 1989[7] and 
1995[8]. 
-  Extensive openness of information both with regard to public plans and the cost and 
capacity structure of existing energy plants. In Denmark there is a law5, which requires, 
that any information between a public organisation and any other organisation is 
accessible to the public.  
-  The establishment of independent energy offices6 and test centres, which can give advises 
to the public regarding the possibilities and potentials with regard to energy conservation 
and renewable energy. In Denmark such energy offices and Nordvestjysk Folkecenter for 
renewable energy7 got small funds, and has played an important role for the tehnological 
innovation process.  
- Supply public funds to institutions, where the board is independent of the old fossil fuel 
interests. In Denmark this was done by means of an institution8, which had means to 
support a set of pilot plant within renewable energy possible. 
The general line in these proposals is, that the Parliament should make sure, that the 
economic independent groups and the general public is getting free access to information at 
the energy scene and also sufficient financial resources to be able to develop alternative 
technical and institutional scenarios. If these “political liberalisation” reforms are introduced 
and persistently secured, the public and the parliamentarian will get the “freedom of choice” 
between different technological and organisational scenarios at the energy scene. 
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